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Abstract: 
 
 In this study, we use data from the SSBFs to provide new information about the use of 
credit by small businesses in the U.S. More specifically, we first analyze firms that do and do not 
use credit; and then analyze why some firms use trade credit while others use bank credit. We 
find that one in five small firms uses no credit, one in five uses trade credit only, one in five uses 
bank credit only, and two in five use both bank credit and trade credit. These results are 
consistent across the three SSBFs we examine—1993, 1998 and 2003.  
 When compared to firms that use credit, we find that firms using no credit are 
significantly smaller, more profitable, more liquid and of better credit quality; but hold fewer 
tangible assets. We also find that firms using no credit are more likely to be found in the services 
industries and in the wholesale and retail-trade industries. In general, these findings are 
consistent with the pecking-order theory of firm capital structure. 
 Firms that use trade credit are larger, more liquid, of worse credit quality, and less likely 
to be a firm that primarily provides services. Among firms that use trade credit, the amount used 
as a percentage of assets is positively related to liquidity and negatively related to credit quality 
and is lower at firms that primarily provide services. In general, these results are consistent with 
the financing-advantage theory of trade credit.  
 Firms that use bank credit are larger, less profitable, less liquid and more opaque as 
measured by firm age, i.e., younger. Among firms that use bank credit, the amount used as a 
percentage of assets is positively related to firm liquidity and to firm opacity as measured by firm 
age. Again, these results are generally consistent with the pecking-order theory of capital 
structure, but with some notable exceptions.  
 We contribute to the literature on the availability of credit in at least two important ways.  
First, we provide the first rigorous analysis of the differences between small U.S. firms that do 
and do not use credit.  Second, for those small U.S. firms that do participate in the credit 
markets, we provide new evidence regarding factors that determine their use of trade credit and 
of bank credit, and whether these two types of credit are substitutes (Meltzer, 1960) or 
complements (Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004). Our evidence strongly suggests that they are 
complements.   
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Bank Credit, Trade Credit or No Credit: 
Evidence from the Surveys of Small Business Finances 
 
1. Introduction 
Among small businesses, who uses credit? Among those that use credit, from where do 
they obtain funding—from their suppliers, i.e., trade credit, from their financial institutions, i.e., 
bank credit, or from both? The answers to these questions are of great importance not only to the 
small firms themselves, but also to prospective lenders to these firms and to policymakers 
interested in the financial health of these firms.1
The availability of credit is one of the most fundamental issues facing a small business 
and therefore, has received much attention in the academic literature (See, for example, Petersen 
and Rajan, 1994, 1997; Berger and Udell, 1995, 2006; Cole, 1998; Cole, Goldberg and White, 
2004; and Cole 2008, 2009).  However, many small firms—as many as one in four, according to 
data from the 2003 Survey of Small Business Finances—indicate that they do not use any credit 
whatsoever. We refer to these firms as “non-borrowers.” These firms have received virtually no 
attention from academic researchers.  
Both theory dating back to Schumpeter (1934)2 and more recent empirical research (e.g., 
King and Levine, 1993a, 1993b; Rajan and Zingales, 1998) indicate that firms using little or no 
debt will be capital-constrained and, as a consequence, will grow more slowly, hire fewer 
workers and make fewer productive investments than firms utilizing debt in their capital 
structure. A better understanding of these firms should provide policymakers with guidance in 
how to tailor economic and tax policies to help small businesses obtain credit when they need 
                                                 
1 Data from the Federal Reserve Board’s Surveys of Small Business Finances indicate that about 
one third of all small-business debt is in the form of trade credit, about the same portion as is 
obtained from commercial banks. See, e.g., Robb (2002). 
 
2 Aghion and Howitt (1988) provide a comprehensive exposition of Schumpeter’s theory of 
economic growth. 
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credit, thereby increasing both employment and GDP. 
 In this study, we first analyze firms that do and do not use credit, i.e., leveraged and 
unleveraged firms; and then analyze how firms that do use credit (leveraged firms) allocate their 
liabilities between bank credit (obtained from financial institutions) and trade credit (obtained 
from suppliers), in order to shed new light upon these critically important issues. We utilize data 
from the Federal Reserve Board’s 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finances 
(hereafter “SSBFs”)—a series of nationally representative samples of small U.S. businesses—to 
estimate a Heckman selection model, where the manager of a firm first decides if it needs credit, 
and then decides from where to obtain this credit—from financial institutions (in the form of 
bank credit) or from suppliers (in the form of trade credit).  
 We find that one in five small firms uses no credit, one in five uses trade credit only, one 
in five uses bank credit only, and two in five use both bank credit and trade credit. From these 
results it is clear that trade credit is more than just a substitute for bank credit, as 40 percent of 
small businesses use both types of credit simultaneously. These results are consistent across the 
three SSBFs we examine—1993, 1998 and 2003.  
When compared to firms that use credit, we find that non-borrowers are significantly 
smaller, more profitable, more liquid and of better credit quality; but hold fewer tangible assets. 
We also find that non-borrowers are more likely to be found in the services industries and in the 
wholesale and retail-trade industries. In general, these findings are consistent with the 
pecking-order theory of firm capital structure. 
 Firms that use trade credit are larger, more liquid, of worse credit quality, and less likely 
to be a firm that primarily provides services. Among firms that use trade credit, the amount of 
trade credit used (as a percentage of assets) is positively related to liquidity and negatively 
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related to credit quality and is lower at firms that primarily provide services. In general, these 
results are consistent with the financing-advantage theory of trade credit.  
 Firms that use bank credit are larger, less profitable, less liquid and younger. Among 
these firms, the amount of bank credit used (as a percentage of assets) is positively related to 
firm liquidity and to firm opacity as measured by firm age. Again, these results are generally 
consistent with the pecking-order theory of capital structure, but with some notable exceptions. 
The amount of bank credit used is positively related to profitability and negatively related to 
tangibility of assets, both in contradiction to the pecking-order theory. 
Why is this analysis of importance? According to the U.S. Department of Treasury and 
Internal Revenue Service, there were more than 23 million nonfarm sole proprietorships, more 
than 2 million partnerships with less than $1 million in assets and more than 5 million 
corporations with less than $1 million in assets that filed tax returns for 2006.3 Small firms are 
vital to the U.S. economy. According to the U.S. Small Business Administration, small 
businesses account for half of all U.S. private-sector employment and produced 64% of net job 
growth in the U.S. between 1993 and 2008.4 Therefore, a better understanding of who uses credit 
and from where they obtain financing can help policymakers to take actions that will lead to 
more jobs and faster economic growth. 
We contribute to the literature on the availability of credit in at least two important ways.  
                                                 
3 See the U.S. Internal Revenue Service statistics for nonfarm sole proprietorships at 
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/0,,id=134481,00.html, for partnerships at 
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/bustaxstats/article/0,,id=97153,00.html, and for corporations at 
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/bustaxstats/article/0,,id=97145,00.html. The year 2006 is used for 
reference because it was the latest year for which statistics were available at the time this article 
was written. 
  
4 See, “Frequently Asked Questions,” Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration 
(2009). For research purposes, the SBA and Federal Reserve Board define small businesses as 
independent firms with fewer than 500 employees. We follow that definition in this research. 
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First, we document that one in five small U.S. firms uses no bank credit or trade credit, and 
provide the first rigorous analysis of the differences in these firms and other small U.S. firms that 
do use credit.5 A better understanding of why one in five small U.S. firms uses no credit should 
provide both academics and policymakers with new insights into why these firms choose not to 
participate in the credit markets, and what the economic and financial consequences are for such 
firms. Our new evidence also should provide guidance to policymakers regarding how to tailor 
economic and tax policies as well as regulations to encourage unleveraged firms that are credit 
constrained to enter the credit markets. 
Second, for those small U.S. firms that do participate in the credit markets, we provide 
new evidence regarding factors that determine their use of and trade credit and of bank credit, 
and whether these two types of credit are substitutes (Meltzer, 1960) or complements (Burkart 
and Ellingsen, 2004). Our evidence strongly suggests that they are complements, as two in five 
small U.S. firms consistently use credit of both types. This is not surprising because trade credit 
is primarily short-term whereas bank credit is typically longer-term.  
This new evidence contributes to the literature on trade credit, especially to the body of 
evidence regarding the validity of the financing-advantage theory of trade credit (Petersen and 
Rajan, 1997). This evidence has important implications for the Federal Reserve as it conducts 
monetary policy because trade credit can confound changes in monetary policy, depending upon 
whether firms increase or decrease their reliance upon trade credit when money is tight (Meltzer 
1960). 
                                                 
5 Other researchers (e.g., Chakravarty and Yilmazer (2009) and Cole (2009)) have examined 
differences in firms that do and do not apply for credit, but not differences in firms that do or do 
not use credit. According to Cole (2009), a substantial portion of firms that do not apply for 
credit reports substantial debt in their capital structure.  
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2. Review of the Literature 
2.1 Availability of Credit to Small Businesses 
 The issue of availability of credit to small businesses has been studied by financial 
economists for at least sixty years, dating back at least to Wendt (1947), who examines the 
availability of loans to small businesses in California. Since then, scores of articles have 
addressed this issue. We will limit our review of the literature to the most prominent studies 
using SSBF data that have appeared in the financial economics literature during the past two 
decades. 
 A large body of research has developed around the seminal work of Petersen and Rajan 
(1994), who were the first to analyze credit availability using data from the SSBF. This research 
has focused on the importance of firm-lender relationships in the allocation of credit. Because of 
the relative opacity of small firms, those firms with stronger relationships with their prospective 
lenders are more likely to receive credit. Petersen and Rajan (1994) use data from the 1987 SSBF 
to find that close ties with creditors lead to greater availability of credit at lower rates of interest. 
 Berger and Udell (1995) were the first to extend Petersen and Rajan, also using data from 
the 1987 SSBF. These authors focus their analysis only on lines of credit, a type of lending 
where relationships should be especially important. They find that loan rates are lower when 
firms have longer pre-existing relationships. 
 Cole (1998) was the first published study to analyze data from the 1993 SSBF. He 
focuses on the lender’s decision whether or not to extend credit rather than on the rate charged 
by the lender, and finds that it is the existence, rather than the length, of the firm-lender 
relationship that affects the likelihood a lender will extend credit. 
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Two other recent articles using the SSBF data to analyze credit to small businesses are 
especially relevant to the proposed study. Cole (2008) analyzes the determinants of capital 
structure at small U.S. businesses, testing the two major competing theories of capital structure 
(the pecking-order and static trade-off theories). His results are broadly supportive of the 
pecking-order theory, in that leverage is negatively related to firm size, age, profitability and 
credit quality and positively related to tangibility and limited liability. However, he provides no 
evidence on the subset of small businesses that choose not to use credit. 
Cole (2009) analyzes firms that choose whether or not to apply for credit based upon 
their most recent loan application during the previous three years, and then whether or not the 
firms were successful in obtaining credit. He finds that firms that choose not to apply for credit 
are very similar to firms that do apply for and do obtain credit, and that both groups are very 
different from firms that apply for and are denied credit. While this study appears to be very 
similar to the proposed study, in fact, it is not. Cole (2009) also finds that the average firm that 
chose not to apply for credit reported allocating 62 percent of its assets to debt rather than equity. 
In other words, these firms use credit and appear to have reached their target capital structure, 
which explains why they did not apply for additional debt. In our proposed study, we will 
analyze the subset of firms that choose zero as their ratio of debt to assets.  
 
2.2 Use of Trade Credit by Small Businesses 
Trade credit also is an important source of funding for small businesses. In general, trade 
credit is considered an expensive alternative to bank debt, so researchers have sought to explain 
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why it remains a pervasive source of financing for small businesses.6 In their seminal article on 
trade credit, Petersen and Rajan (1997) list and summarize three broad groupings of theories of 
trade credit: financing advantage, price discrimination and transaction costs.  
According to the transactions-cost theory, which dates back to Ferris (1981), trade credit 
reduces the costs of paying a supplier for multiple deliveries by cumulating the financial 
obligations from these deliveries into a single monthly or quarterly payment. By separating the 
payment from the delivery, this arrangement enables the firm to separate the uncertain delivery 
schedule from what can now be a more predictable payment cycle. This enables the firm to 
manage its inventory more efficiently. 
According to the financing-advantage theory, a supplier of trade credit has an 
informational advantage over a bank lender in assessing and monitoring the creditworthiness of 
its customers, which, in turn, gives the supplier a cost advantage in lending to its customers. The 
supplier also has a cost advantage in repossessing and reselling assets of its customers in the 
event of default (Mian and Smith, 1992). Smith (1987) argues that, by delaying payment via 
trade credit, customers can verify the quality of the supplier’s product before paying for that 
product. In a theoretical paper, Biais and Gollier (1997) assume that suppliers have private 
information about their customer and demonstrate that trade credit alleviates information 
asymmetries that otherwise would preclude financing of positive NPV projects. According to 
Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), the information advantage derives from the transaction by which 
the supplier provides inputs to its customer, in that cash is easily diverted but input supplies are 
not. In addition, this may boost investment, leading banks to increase their lending to the 
                                                 
6 Based upon the traditional “2/10 net 30” terms of trade credit, where the customer gets a 2% 
discount for paying within ten days and pays no penalties so long as payment in full is made 
within 30 days, the implied interest rate for a firm paying on the 30th day is approximately 45.5% 
on an annual percentage rate basis. (2% compounded for (365/20) periods, or 1.02^(365/20) – 1.) 
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customer, as well. Hence, trade credit can be a complement to bank credit. 
According to the price-discrimination theory, which dates back to Meltzer (1960), a 
supplier uses trade credit to price discriminate among its customers. Creditworthy customers will 
pay promptly so as to get any available discounts while risky customers will find the price of 
trade credit to be attractive relative to other options. The supplier also discriminates in favor of 
the risky firm because the supplier holds an implicit equity stake in the customer, equal to the 
present value of future profits from sales to the customer, and wants to protect that equity 
position by extending temporary short-term financing. Meltzer (1960) concludes that trade 
creditors redistribute traditional bank credit during periods of tight money, so that trade credit 
serves as a substitute for bank credit when money is tight. Nilsen (2002) provides strong 
empirical support for Meltzer’s conclusions, as well as supporting the existence of a “bank 
lending channel” for the transmission of monetary policy.7
One version of the price-discrimination theory posits that trade creditors are more lenient 
than bank lenders when a firm encounters financial distress, so that riskier firms will allocate a 
larger share of their borrowing to trade creditors in exchange for the financial flexibility they 
obtain in the event that they become distressed. Suppliers have what amounts to an equity stake 
in the firms to which they lend and, therefore, are more accommodating to their customers when 
the customers encounter financial problems. Bank lenders, on the other hand, are more likely to 
be secured by collateral and hold claims that are senior to those of trade creditors, so they are 
more likely to pursue liquidation in the event of default than are trade creditors (Berger and 
Udell, 1998). Huyghebaert, Van de Gucht and Van Hulle (2007) provide empirical evidence in 
support of this theory, finding that Belgian firms in industries with high historical failure rates 
                                                 
7 The bank “lending channel” theory posits that banks respond to tight monetary policy by 
contracting loan volume, which reduces investment by borrowing firms. 
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and high liquidation values use more trade credit that other Belgian firms.  
Petersen and Rajan (1997) use data from the 1987 SSBF to find that the information 
provided by banking relationships does not appear to affect the amount of trade credit offered by 
suppliers, which they interpret as supportive of the financing-advantage theory that suppliers 
collect and use different private information about their customers than do financial institutions. 
Petersen and Rajan also find that small U.S. firms with longer banking relationships hold lower 
levels of accounts payable than other firms, while firms in metropolitan areas with few financial 
institutions held higher levels of accounts payable than firms in other metropolitan areas. They 
interpret their results as evidence that trade credit falls below bank credit in the pecking order of 
capital structure, consistent with Meltzer (1960).  
Fisman and Love (2003) extend this line of research by examining small firms in 
countries with less developed financial markets and find that “firms in industries with higher 
rates of accounts payable exhibit higher rates of growth.” Love, Preve and Sarria-Allende (2007) 
find that trade credit in Asian countries fell for several years following the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis. They interpret their evidence as consistent with a redistribution view of trade credit, 
whereby financially strong firms redistribute bank credit to financially weak firms. 
Ng, Smith and Smith (1999) contradict Meltzer’s bank-substitute theory but support 
Ferris’ transaction-cost theory with evidence based upon a survey of credit managers at publicly 
traded U.S. firms listed on CompuStat. They conclude that “credit terms are stable over time” 
and that firms “do not respond to fluctuations in market demand” but that there is “wide variation 
across industries in credit terms, but little variation within industries.” 
Cuñat (2007) argues that trade creditors have an advantage over bank creditors in 
collecting non-collateralized lending, in that a trade creditor can threaten to cut off goods that it 
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supplies to the borrower so long as switching suppliers is costly. This advantage enables trade 
creditors to lend more than banks are willing to lend. In this sense, trade credit is a complement 
rather than a substitute for bank credit, and firms should be expected to utilize both types of 
credit even when banking markets are competitive. However, this relationship also will lead 
trade creditors to provide liquidity to borrowers that are facing temporary liquidity problems and 
at increased level of financial distress. Cuñat uses panel data on U.K. firms from the FAME-
Bureau Van Dijk database to test his model. 
 
3. Data 
 To conduct this study, we use data from the Federal Reserve Board’s 1993, 1998 and 
2003 Surveys of Small Business Finances.8 In each survey, the firms surveyed constitute a 
nationally representative sample of small businesses operating in the U.S. as of year-end prior to 
the survey, where a small business is defined as a non-financial, non-farm enterprise employing 
fewer than 500 employees. The 1993 (1998) survey data are broadly representative of 
approximately five million firms operating in the U.S. as of year-end 1993 (1998) while the 2003 
survey data are broadly representative of approximately six million firms operating in the U.S. as 
of year-end 2003.  
 The SSBF provides detailed information about each firm's sources of financing as well as 
information about each firm’s balance sheet, either of which can be used to determine whether or 
not a firm uses trade credit and/or bank credit. We choose to used the detailed information about 
financing sources rather than rely upon the balance-sheet data. Specifically, each SSBF includes 
                                                 
8  See Elliehausen and Wolken (1990) for a detailed description of the 1987 survey, Cole and 
Wolken (1995) for a detailed description of the 1993 survey, Bitler, Robb and Wolken (2001) for 
a detailed description of the 1998 survey, and Mach and Wolken (2006) for a detailed description 
of the 2003 survey. 
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a question asking whether or not the firm used trade credit in the reference year of the survey, 
and asking whether or not the firm had any outstanding bank credit in the reference year of the 
survey. We use the answers to these questions to classify a firm as using no credit, using trade 
credit only, using bank credit only, or using both bank credit and trade credit. 
 Specifically, we classify a firm as “using trade credit” if the firm reported that it did use 
trade credit in the reference year of the survey.9 We classify a firm as “using bank credit” if the 
firm reported that it had any loans outstanding in the reference year of the survey.10 We classify 
a firm as “using no credit” if the firm reported that it used no trade credit and that it used no bank 
credit during the reference year. Similarly, we classify a firm as “using both bank credit and 
trade credit” if it reported that it used both bank credit and used trade credit. 
 We calculate the amount of bank credit from the outstanding balances reported by the 
firm for each type of loan. We are forced to estimate the amount of trade credit from the amount 
of accounts payable because the questionnaire does not ask the firm to report this amount.   
 For firms obtaining credit, the SSBF provides information on the identity and 
characteristics of the lender through a series of questions about the firm’s use of financial 
services, including lines of credit, mortgage loans, equipment loans, motor vehicle loans and 
other loans. For each type of loan, the SSBF identifies the amount of the loan and the type of 
                                                 
9 In the 2998 and 2003 SSBFs, the firm was asked “During [YEAR], did [FIRM] make any 
purchases of goods or services from suppliers on account rather than pay before or at the time of 
the delivery?” In 1993, the question was slightly different: “Did the firm purchase any goods or 
services on account during 1993 rather than pay for the purchases before or at the time of 
delivery? 
 
10 Each SSBF includes a series of questions about the firm’s use of credit during the reference 
year of the survey, including lines of credit, mortgages, motor vehicle loans, equipment loans, 
leases, owner loans and other loans. We classify a firm as using bank credit if it answered yes to 
any of these questions except for owner loans. For example, the firms were asked “During 
[YEAR], did the firm have any business lines of credit or revolving credit agreements?” If the 
firm answers “yes” then it also is asked for the outstanding balance of all loans of that type. We 
use this information to calculate the amount of bank credit.  
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institution extending the credit.11   
The survey data also provide information on each firm’s balance sheet and income 
statement; its credit history; the firm's characteristics, including standard industrial classification 
(SIC), organizational form, and age; and demographic characteristics of each firm's primary 
owner, including age, education, experience, and credit history. Balance-sheet and income-
statement data are derived from the enterprise's year-end financial statements. Credit history, 
firm characteristics, and demographic characteristics of each firm's primary owner are taken as of 
year-end. 
 
4. Methodology 
In order to provide new evidence on who uses credit and from where, we employ both 
univariate and multivariate tests. In all of our tests, we employ the survey sampling weights 
because the SSBFs do not consist of random samples; rather, they are stratified random samples, 
where large and minority-owned firms are over-represented relative to smaller and white-owned 
firms. 
First, as described above, we classify firms into one of four categories of borrower type 
based upon their responses to questions regarding the structure of their liabilities. Use No Credit 
firms are those firms that reported using no bank credit and using no trade credit; Use Credit 
firms are those firms that reported using either or both types of credit.  
                                                 
11 The 2003 SSBF includes questions that ask the respondent to identify the type of institution or 
source for each financial service it obtains, including all loans. The categories are:  
1: commercial bank; 2: savings bank; 3: savings and loan association; 4: credit union; 5: finance 
company; 6: insurance company; 7: brokerage or mutual fund company; 8: leasing company; 9: 
mortgage company; 10: venture-capital firm or small-business investment company; 11: other 
business firm; 12: family or other individual; 13: government agency (includes SBA); 14: other 
type; 15: supplier firm; 16: credit card processing; 17: check clearing; 18: factoring; 19: owner, 
himself or herself; 20: 401K/retirement; and 21: consolidated/multiple institutions. 
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Once we have classified our sample firms, we calculate descriptive statistics for Use No 
Credit firms and Use Credit firms, and then test for significant differences in these two types of 
firms. For Use Credit firms, we also provide descriptive statistics on use of the two different 
sources of credit, e.g., trade credit and bank credit. 
We also conduct multivariate tests on the data.  First, we use a weighted univariate probit 
regression model to test hypotheses about differences in the Use Credit firms and Use No Credit 
firms.  
 borrower type =  f (firm characteristics, owner characteristics)                              (1A) 
where: 
 borrower type is equal to one if the firm is a use credit firm and equal to zero if the 
 firm is a use no credit firm, as defined above;  
 firm characteristics is a vector of variables related to the firm that are expected to 
 influence availability of credit, such as credit history, size, profitability, age, leverage, 
 etc.; and 
 owner characteristics is a vector of variables related to the primary owner that are 
 expected to influence availability of credit, such as age, education, race, ethnicity and 
 gender.  
These tests provide the first comprehensive and rigid statistical evidence on how these two 
groups of firms differ. 
 Third, we use equation 1A as the first equation in bivariate-probit selection model (see  
Van de Venn and Van Pragg (1981) and Greene (1992) and (1996)), where the second equation 
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is a model of whether the firm used trade credit (equation 2A) or an model of whether the firm 
used bank credit (equation 2B):12
 use trade credit =  f (firm characteristics, owner characteristics)                          (2A) 
where: 
 use trade credit is equal to one if the firm uses trade credit and equal to zero otherwise. 
 
 use bank credit =  f (firm characteristics, owner characteristics)                            (2B) 
where: 
 use bank credit is equal to one if the firm uses bank credit and equal to zero otherwise. 
 
This selection model is an extension of the bivariate probit model, which itself is an 
extension of the univariate probit model. We use a probit model because our dependent variables 
are binary (i.e., they take on a value of zero or one), so that ordinary least squares is 
inappropriate. We use a bivariate probit selection model to estimate equations (2A) and (2B) in 
order to account for a non-random selection mechanism operating on those firms that use trade 
credit and on those firms that use bank credit. We cannot use the standard Heckman (1979) 
selection model because the dependent variable in our second equation is binary; in Heckman’s 
model, the dependent variable in the second equation is continuous and can be estimated by 
weighted least squares. The bivariate probit model consists of two equations 
y*1 = β1 ' x1 + є1, y1 = sign(y*1)       (1) 
and 
y*2 = β2 ' x2 + є2, y2 = sign(y*2)       (2) 
                                                 
12 See Greene (2003) for more information about the bivariate probit model. 
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where: 
є1, є2 ~ Bivariate Normal(0,0,1,1,ρ) 
In the bivariate probit selection model, [y1, x1] are only observed when y2 is equal to one, so the 
error terms in equations (1) and (2) must be re-specified as єj = exp(γj , zj) uj, where [u1, u2] have 
the bivariate standard normal distribution. The estimated correlation coefficient ρ (the correlation 
between error terms є1 and є2) can be used to test for selection bias. If ρ is statistically significant, 
then we can reject the null hypothesis that selection bias is not present. 
 Fourth, we use equations 2A and 2B as the first equation in the standard two-equation 
Heckman sample-selection estimator estimated by the method of maximum likelihood, where the 
second equation is a model of the percentage of assets allocated to trade credit (equation 3A) or 
the percentage of assets allocated to bank credit (equation 3B): 
 trade credit percentage = f ( firm characteristics, owner characteristics)                 (3A) 
where: 
 trade credit percentage is equal to the percentage of total assets allocated to trade  credit; 
 
 bank credit percentage = f ( firm characteristics, owner characteristics)                 (3B) 
where: 
 bank credit percentage is equal to the percentage of total assets allocated to bank credit. 
 
For explanatory variables, we generally follow the existing literature on the availability 
of credit and capital structure. We include a vector of firm characteristics that includes public 
reputation as proxied by the log of firm age; firm size as measured by the log of sales; firm credit 
quality as proxied by firm delinquency (whether or not the firm has been delinquent on business 
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obligations during the previous three years); firm profitability as measured by return on assets; 
firm financial slack as proxied by the ratio of cash to total assets; firm current assets as measured 
by the sum of accounts receivable, inventory and other current assets scaled by total assets; firm 
tangible assets as measured by the sum of land and depreciable assets scaled by total assets; firm 
governance as measured by percentage ownership of the primary owner and a dummy variable 
for corporations; and firm industry as measured by a set of nine dummy variables for one- or 
two-digit SIC code defining nine broad industries (construction, primary manufacturing, 
secondary manufacturing, transportation, wholesale trade, retail trade, insurance and real estate, 
business services and professional services). 
A vector of owner characteristics includes the race (Asian or Black), ethnicity (Hispanic) 
and gender (Female) as measured by dummy variables indicating that the firm’s primary owner 
is  Black, Hispanic, Asian and female, respectively; owner’s reputation as measured by the log of 
Owner Age; owner’s business experience as measured by the number of years that the primary 
owner has been an owner or manager of a business; dummy variables for the highest educational 
attainment of the firm’s primary owner (High School Degree, Some College, College Degree or 
Graduate Degree); owner credit quality as proxied by Owner Delinquency (whether or not the 
primary owner has been delinquent on personal obligations). Table 1 presents a summary of the 
variable definitions. 
 
5. Hypotheses 
5.1 Firms that Use Credit vs. Firms that Use No Credit 
Our primary hypotheses relate to differences between firms that use credit and firms that 
use no credit, i.e., that use no bank credit and use no trade credit. This eliminates a large number 
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of potential explanatory variables, such as firm leverage and the outcome of the firm’s most 
recent loan application, as these variables can only take on certain values when the firm uses 
credit. However, there remain a large number of variables of interest that we can use to test our 
hypotheses—many of which are tied to the pecking-order theory and trade-off theory of capital 
structure.13
The pecking-order theory of capital structure suggests that profitable firms, firms with 
more “financial slack,” and firms in certain industries that require little in the way of tangible 
assets use less debt than other firms. Therefore, we expect that use no credit firms have higher 
return on assets, have more cash (our proxy for financial slack), have fewer tangible assets and 
are more likely to be in the service industries (insurance/real estate, business services and 
professional services) than are use credit firms. Corporations enjoy limited liability and therefore 
should be more likely to use credit, so we expect to find a positive relation between corporation 
and use credit.  
Behavior finance suggests that owners of use no credit firms act irrationally, as these 
firms are failing to take advantage of either the interest-free financing from typical trade credit 
terms or the debt-tax shield from bank financing, as well as the opportunity to leverage up their 
return on equity.14 The managers of these firms may simply be financially unsophisticated, or 
may have an irrational aversion to debt of any form and prefer to pay cash for all purchases. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that use no credit firms are more likely to be minority-owned (Asian, 
                                                 
13 Cole (2008) explores in detail how the static trade-off and pecking-order theories of capital 
structure explains the capital structure of small U.S. firms. 
 
14 More than ten percent of the firms reporting zero debt in the 2003 SSBF also reported that they 
did not apply because they feared rejection, which is arguably irrational as the costs of applying 
are negligible while the gains from applying (potentially receiving a loan) are quite large. This 
group of discouraged firms may be quite different from firms that report zero debt and did not 
apply simply because they did not need credit. 
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Black or Hispanic), located in rural areas, and have owners with less experience and less 
education than other types of firms. (We measure education using a two dummy variables for 
highest educational attainment—college and graduate. 
 
5.2 Firms that Use Trade Credit and Firms that Use Bank Credit 
 Among firms reporting that they use credit, we also test hypotheses regarding the choice 
between trade credit and what we will generically refer to as “bank credit,” which encompasses 
all other sources of credit (see footnote 11 for a comprehensive list) but is dominated by credit 
from banks and other financial institutions.  
One version of the price-discrimination theory suggests that trade creditors are more 
lenient in the event of default than are bank creditors, who tend to hold more secure positions in 
liquidation largely due to collateralization. Therefore, we expect to find that variables indicating 
worse credit quality are associated with higher allocations of total liabilities to trade credit. These 
include the D&B credit score, the number of firm delinquencies, and the number of owner 
delinquencies. 
Petersen and Rajan (1997) hypothesize that trade creditors use information developed by 
banks in evaluating customers for trade credit. They use two proxies for bank information to test 
this hypothesis. First, the authors calculate the length of the firm’s longest bank relationship. 
Second, they use information from the firms’ most recent loan application to construct a variable 
indicating that the firm was denied credit. We also calculate these two variables and expect 
negative relations with the use of trade credit. 
Owners with greater private benefits of control should allocate more of their liabilities to 
trade credit so as to ensure that they do not lose those benefits of private control. We follow the 
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corporate governance literature in measuring the benefits of private control using the “wedge” 
between ownership and control (see Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000)). The larger is the 
primary owner’s ownership percentage, the less he has to gain from self-dealing and perquisite 
consumption. The logic of this measure follows from the seminal paper on agency costs and 
ownership structure by Jensen and Meckling (1976), which is tested using small business data by 
Ang, Cole and Lin (2000). When the primary owner owns 100% of the firm, each dollar of 
perquisite consumption costs him one dollar, but as ownership falls to α, where 0% < α < 100%, 
the primary owner’s cost fall to α times one dollar. In other words, the primary owner realizes 
the full benefit of the perquisite consumption, but the cost of the perquisite consumption is only 
his ownership percentage times the value of the perquisites. We hypothesize that the ownership 
percentage should be negatively related to the use of any credit—bank or trade.  
According to the financing-advantage theory, bank creditors are more likely than trade 
creditors to liquidate a firm when liquidation value is greater than the value of the firm as a going 
concern because they have a much smaller implicit equity stake in the firm. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that firms with greater liquidation value will use more trade credit. We proxy the 
value of assets in liquidation using the ratio of tangible assets to total assets, where tangible 
assets are defined as the sum of land and depreciable assets. Alternatively, firms with more 
tangible assets may prefer to finance them with credit of matched maturity, so that they prefer to 
use more bank credit. If this is the case, then we expect tangible assets to have a negative 
relation with the use of trade credit and a positive relation to the use of bank credit. 
Owners of firms with greater growth opportunities have more to lose in liquidation than 
other firms, as the present value of those growth opportunities is lost. Therefore, growth firms 
should favor equity over bank debt, but favor trade credit over bank debt because, according to 
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the financing-advantage theory, trade creditors are expected to be more lenient to firms in 
financial distress. We proxy growth opportunities using an indicator variable for growth is 
positive defined as equal to one if the firm reports that its annual sales revenues had increased 
from the prior period and equal to zero otherwise. We expect a negative relation between growth 
is positive and both use credit and use bank credit but a positive relation with use trade credit. 
According to Meltzer’s bank-substitute theory, the use of trade credit relative to bank 
credit should be greater during times of tight money. By comparing statistics from the three 
SSBFs, we should be able to shed some light on this theory, as the target Fed Fund rate varied 
from 1.00% in 2003 to 3.00% in 1993 and a high of 5.50% during the first three quarters of 
1998. Therefore, we expect to find the lowest percentage of assets allocated to trade credit in 
2003 and the highest in 1998, with 1993 falling in between. 
Petersen and Rajan (1997, p. 678) point out that the interest-free financing from typical 
trade credit terms (2/10 net 30) “dominates paying cash,” so that one should “expect all firms to 
borrow during the initial period.” Yet our survey data show that many firms do not borrow. We 
hypothesize that firms in certain industries have little or no need for trade credit, such as those in 
insurance/finance, business services and professional services, while others have very large 
needs, such as those in construction and manufacturing. Firms in industries characterized by 
large investments in tangible and depreciable assets, such as construction, manufacturing, and 
transportation, also should be more likely to use bank credit. 
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6. Results 
 
6.1 Univariate Results 
 
Table 2 shows the distributions of firms from each of the three SSBFs into four 
categories based upon whether or not the firm used trade credit or bank credit during the survey 
year: no credit, trade credit only, bank credit only, and bank and trade credit. Interestingly, the 
distributions are remarkably similar across the three surveys: roughly twenty percent of the firms 
fall into each of the first three categories with the remaining forty percent falling into the bank 
and trade credit category. In other words, one in five firms uses no credit, and roughly three out 
of five firms use trade credit and three out of five firms use bank credit, but roughly one in five 
firms uses bank credit but not trade credit and roughly one in five firms uses trade credit but not 
bank credit. 
These distributions provide some evidence on Meltzer’s bank-substitute theory. 
Consistent with this theory, the use of bank credit only was highest in 2003 when interest rates 
were lowest and lowest in 1998 when interest rates were highest, whereas use of trade credit only 
was highest in 1998 and lowest in 2003.  
Table 3A, 3B and 3C present descriptive statistics from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 SSBFs, 
respectively, first for the full sample, and then separately for Use credit firms and use no credit 
firms. The tables also present the results from a t-test for statistically significant differences in 
the means of the use credit and use no credit firms.  
For the full sample of the 2003 SSBF (shown in Table 3A), the average firm had annual 
sales of $624,307, return on assets (ROA) of 55.7 basis points, had current assets equal to 31 
percent of total assets, had tangible assets equal to 33 percent of total assets, had growth in sales 
for 41 percent of the sample, was organized as a corporation for 45 percent of the sample, had 
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been in business for 14.2 years and had a categorical D&B credit score of 3.61 (where 1 is worst 
and 6 is best). The average owner was 51.5 years old, and 26.3 percent of owners were female, 
3.9 percent were Black and 4.4 percent were Hispanic; 29.1 percent had a college degree, 20.8 
percent had a graduate degree and the rest had less than a college degree. By industry, 11.7 
percent were in construction, 7.1 percent were in manufacturing, 3.9 percent were in 
transportation, 5.7 percent were in wholesale trade, 18.7 percent were in retail trade, 6.7 percent 
were in insurance/real estate (financial institutions are excluded), 25.3 percent are in business 
services and 21.0 percent are in professional services. 
 When compared with firms that use credit, firms that use no credit are significantly 
smaller as measured by sales ($179,933 vs. $741,592), more profitable as measured by ROA 
(73.5 basis points vs. 51.0 basis points), allocate less of their assets to both current assets (29.4 
percent vs. 31.0 percent) and tangible assets (27.8 percent vs. 34.1 percent), are less likely to be 
growing in terms of sales (32.1 percent vs. 42.8 percent), are less likely to be organized as 
corporations (27.1 percent vs. 49.7 percent), are younger (12.97 years vs. 14.51 years) and have 
worse credit scores (3.459 vs. 3.650). Owners of firms that use no credit are older as measured 
by owner age (52.2 years vs. 51.3 years), more likely to be female (39.2 percent vs. 22.9 percent) 
or Black (6.0 percent vs. 3.4 percent); They also are better educated with a college or graduate 
degree (55.6 percent vs. 48.4 percent). By industry, use no credit firms are significantly more 
likely to be found in business services and professional services and significantly less likely to 
be found in construction, manufacturing, transportation and wholesale trade. 
 If we look across Tables 3A, 3B and 3C, we find a number of regularities with respect to 
differences in use credit and use no credit firms, as defined by statistically significant differences 
in means in each of the three SSBFs. Use credit firms are consistently larger as measured by both 
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assets and sales, more profitable as measured by ROA, have less financial slack as measured by 
the ratio of cash to assets, are more likely to be organized as corporations, are much more likely 
to report firm delinquencies, are less likely to be located in rural areas. The owners of use credit 
firms are consistently younger, less likely to be female and have a smaller ownership percentage 
of the firm. By industry, Use Credit firms are more likely to be found in construction, 
manufacturing and wholesale trade and less likely to be found in professional services. 
 
6.2 Multivariate Results 
6.21 Univariate Probit Model Explaining Differences in  
Firms that Use Credit and Firms that Use No Credit 
 Table 4 presents the results from estimating equation (1) using a weighted univariate 
probit model to explain differences in use no credit firms and use credit firms from each of the 
three SSBFs. Many of the significant differences vary, and often change signs across the three 
surveys, so we will focus on the results that are consistent across the three surveys. The 
multivariate results largely confirm findings from the univariate results presented in Tables 3A, 
3B and 3C.  
 As compared to use no credit firms, use credit firms are significantly larger as measured 
by the log of annual sales, less profitable as measured by return on assets, have less financial 
slack as measured by cash, and are more likely to report business delinquencies. However, in a 
multivariate setting, use credit firms have significantly fewer tangible assets, in contrast with the 
univariate results. Use credit firms are more likely to be organized as corporations in 1998 and 
2003 but not in 1993, in spite of the large univariate difference; in 1993, 51.5% of use credit 
firms were corporations as compared with 32.6% of use no credit firms. 
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 Owners of use credit firms are significantly younger as measured by the log of owner 
age, but more experiences as measured by the number of years owning or managing a business, 
and own a smaller percentage of the firm. Differences by race, ethnicity, gender and educational 
attainment are not consistently significant. 
 By industry, use credit firms are significantly less likely to be classified as professional-
services and business-services firms, insurance/real estate firms,) and wholesale-trade and retail-
trade firms as compared with the omitted category of construction firms. 
 
6.22 Bivariate Probit Selection Model  Explaining Differences in  
Firms that Use Trade Credit and Firms that Use No Trade Credit Firms 
 Table 5 presents the results from estimating equation 2A to explain differences in firms 
that use trade credit from firms that use no trade credit, conditional upon using either trade 
credit or bank credit. This equation is estimated using a bivariate probit selection model, where 
we first estimate equation 1 using the full sample and then estimate equation 2A including only 
those firms that reported using either bank credit or trade credit. The estimated correlation 
between the error terms in the two equations is statistically indistinguishable from zero, 
indicating that sample-selection bias is not present when we estimate equation 2A with a simple 
probit model. (Results obtained when we estimate equation 2A using the full sample and no 
selection equation are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 5.) 
 As compared to use no trade credit firms,  use trade credit firms are significantly larger 
as measured by the log of sales, have more financial slack as measured by the ratio of cash to 
assets, and allocate more of their assets to current assets (primarily accounts receivable and 
inventory), and have worse credit quality as proxied by firm delinquency. Return on assets 
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(ROA) is consistently negative but fails to come close to statistical significance. Sales growth, 
corporation, firm age and MSA each flips sign across surveys. 
 Owners of use trade credit firms are significantly less likely to be Hispanic and are 
consistently more educated in terms of having at least a college degree but the education 
variables lack significance in 1998. Percentage ownership is consistently negative but is 
significant only in 1993. Black is consistently negative but is significant only in 2003. Age and 
experience both are consistently positive, but lack statistical significance.  
 By industry, use trade credit firms are significantly less likely to be classified as 
business-services or professional-services firms, insurance/real estate firms, retail-trade firms 
and transportation firms as compared with the omitted category of construction firms. 
 
6.23 Bivariate Probit Selection Model Explaining Differences in  
Firms that Use Bank Credit and  Firms that Use No Bank Credit 
 Table 6 presents the results from estimating equation 2B to explain differences in firms 
that use bank credit from firms that use no bank credit, conditional upon using either bank credit 
or trade credit. Again, this equation is estimated using a bivariate probit selection model, where 
we first estimate equation 1 using the full sample and then estimate equation 2B including only 
those firms that use either bank credit or trade credit. Again, the estimated correlation between 
the error terms in the two equations is statistically indistinguishable from zero, indicating that 
sample-selection bias is not present when we estimate equation 2B with a simple probit model. 
(Results obtained when we estimate equation 2B using the full sample and no selection equation 
are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 6.) 
 As compared to use no bank credit firms, use bank credit firms are significantly larger as 
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measured by the log of sales, are less profitable as measured by ROA, have less financial slack as 
measured by the ratio of cash to assets and are  more opaque (younger) as measured by the log of 
firm age. Sales growth is consistently positive in sign but significant only in 1993. The 
remaining firm variables switch signs across surveys. In general, these results are inconsistent 
with the “core factors” reported by Frank and Goyal (2007) as being the primary determinants of 
firm leverage; whereas they find a positive relation between leverage and tangible assets and a 
negative relation between firm leverage and profitability, we find exactly the opposite. Our 
findings with respect to firm size are consistent: larger firms use more leverage. In general, these 
results also are inconsistent with the pecking-order theory, which predicts a negative sign for 
firm profitability and a positive sign for tangible assets. 
 Owners of use bank credit firms are consistently younger as measured by log of owner 
age, more educated as measured by having a college or graduate degree, and less likely to be 
female or Asian and more likely to be Hispanic, but none of these variables is statistically 
significant across the three SSBFs. The remaining owner variables flip signs across the surveys. 
 By industry, use bank credit firms are significantly more likely to classified as 
transportation and insurance/real estate and less likely to be classified as wholesale-trade or 
retail-trade firms as compared with the omitted category of construction firms.  
 
6.24 WLS Regression to Explain Amount of Trade Credit Used 
 Table 7 presents the results from estimating equation 3A to explain the amount of trade 
credit used by the firm, conditional upon the firm using trade credit. This equation is estimated 
using a two-equation sample-selection model as developed by Heckman (1979), where we first 
estimate equation 2A using the full sample and then estimate equation 3A including only those 
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firms that use trade credit. The estimated correlation between the error terms in the two equations 
is statistically indistinguishable from zero, indicating that sample-selection bias is not present 
when we estimate equation 3A with a simple weighted-least-squares model. 
 Consistent with a number of previous studies, we find that the amount of trade credit 
used decreases with the log of firm age, indicating that younger, more opaque firms about which 
less information is available, rely more heavily upon trade credit. Cuñat (2007) uses firm age as a 
proxy for the strength of the relationship between the trade creditor and borrower and finds a 
nonlinear relation between firm age and the amount of trade credit used, first rising during the 
first five years of a firm’s life and then declining subsequent to that period. We also test 
nonlinear specifications (not shown) where firm age is fit as a two-part spline function of zero to 
five years and then six or more years, as suggested by Cuñat’s results. Our results fail to support 
Cuñat, in that both variables are either insignificant or negative and significant; we do not find a 
positive relation for younger firms. 
 The amount of trade credit used is positively related to financial slack as measured by the 
ratio of cash to assets and to current assets as measured by the sum of accounts receivable, 
inventory and other current assets scaled by total assets. This finding with respect to current 
assets supports our hypothesis that firms try to match the maturities of their assets and liabilities, 
so that firms with high levels of current assets will attempt to fund those assets with current 
liabilities in the form of accounts payable. The finding with respect to cash contrasts with those 
of Cuñat (2007), who finds a negative relation between the amount of trade credit used and 
liquid assets, and argues against his theory that firms use more trade credit when they face 
liquidity constraints. This discrepancy in findings may be attributable to the fact that Cuñat 
(2007) relies upon the FAME database, which provides little information beyond basic balance-
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sheet data; the SSBFs are much more comprehensive datasets, but at the cost of being cross-
sectional snapshots.  For example, Cuñat (2007) has no information on the credit quality of the 
firm or its owner, both of which are consistently significant in our results.  
 The amount of trade credit used is greater both when firm credit quality is worse as 
proxied by firms reporting business delinquencies and when owner credit quality is worse as 
proxied by the primary owner reporting delinquencies on personal obligations. These results 
contradict those of Petersen and Rajan (1997), who find that firms with higher credit quality as 
measured by firm size and profitability use more trade credit. However, Petersen and Rajan rely 
upon the 1987 SSBF, which did not provide the superior measures of credit quality available in 
the three iterations of the SSBF used in this study. In addition, as Cuñat points out, firm size also 
is an important control for the level of the firm’s activity, so it may be inappropriate to use it as a 
proxy for firm credit quality.  
 When we include the ratio of tangible assets to total assets in our  model (not shown), we 
find that this variable is negative and statistically significant; this finding support the prediction 
from Cuñat’s model that firms with fewer tangible asset (that can be pledged as loan collateral) 
should use more trade credit. This finding also is consistent with the results of Petersen and 
Rajan (1997), who find a negative relation between the amount of trade credit used and tangible 
assets. 
 Other than credit quality, none of the owner characteristics are consistently significant in 
explaining the amount of trade credit used, with most flipping signs across the three surveys. 
 By industry, the amount of trade credit used is consistently and significantly smaller 
among firms in the business services, professional services, insurance/real estate, and retail-
trade industries, as compared with the omitted category of construction firms. These results 
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strongly support our hypothesis that use of trade credit is strongly related to a firm’s industry, 
with firms that primarily provide services expected to use significantly less trade credit than 
those that provide tangible products. 
 Not shown in Table 7 are additional regressions where we include the length of the firm’s 
relationship with its primary financial institution and whether or not the firm was denied credit 
during its most recent loan application. Petersen and Rajan (1997) interpret these as  proxies for 
financial institutions’ information about the firm, and argue that it should be positive and 
significant in explaining the amount of trade credit used if trade creditors use financial 
institutions’ information in making their decisions to grant trade credit to the firm. Our results 
are consistent with Petersen and Rajan; like them, we find that both of these variables are 
statistically insignificant in explaining the amount of trade credit used. We follow them in 
interpreting this as evidence that trade creditors generate and rely upon their own information set 
in deciding whether to grant trade credit.  
 
6.25 WLS Regression to Explain Amount of Bank Credit Used 
 Table 8 presents the results from estimating equation 3B to explain the amount of bank 
credit used by the firm (scaled by total assets), conditional upon the firm using bank credit. This 
equation also is estimated using a two-equation sample-selection model as developed by 
Heckman (1979), where we first estimate equation 2B using the full sample and then estimate 
equation 3B including only those firms that use bank credit. Again, the estimated correlation 
between the error terms in the two equations is statistically indistinguishable from zero, 
indicating that sample-selection bias is not present when we estimate equation 3B with a simple 
weighted-least-squares model. 
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 The amount of Bank Credit Used is negatively related to firm size as measured by the log 
of Sales; to financial slack as measured by the ratio of Cash to assets; to Tangible Assets as 
measured by the sum of land and depreciable assets scaled by total assets; and is positively 
related to profitability as measured by ROA and to firm opaqueness (younger) as measured by 
log of Firm Age. These results offer conflicting evidence regarding the pecking-order theory and 
trade-off theory. The results with respect to financial slack and firm opaqueness are supportive of 
the pecking-order theory; whereas the results with respect to profitability are supportive of the 
trade-off theory. The negative sign on Tangible Assets is inconsistent with both theories and with 
results from prior research, including Cole (2008). 
 None of the owner characteristics are consistently significant in explaining the amount of 
bank credit used, with inconsistent results across the three surveys. Education as proxied by 
owners with a graduate degree is consistently negative in explaining the amount of bank credit 
used, but lacks statistical significance in 1993 and 2003. 
 By industry, the amount of bank credit used is greater for transportation firms and lesser 
for retail-trade firms as compared to the omitted category of construction firms. In general, these 
results are consistent with those reported by Cole (2008), who also examined the ratio of total 
loans to total assets from the SSBFs; however, he measured total loans using the balance-sheet 
values rather than the values from the detailed loan information. 
 In summary, the results from analyzing the amount of bank credit used are problematic, 
at best. They conflict with findings of previous research, including studies that use the SSBFs. 
We speculate that these conflicts arise from our decision to estimate the amount of bank credit 
from the detailed information on loans reported by the firm rather than by the amount of loans 
reported on the balance sheet. The correlation between these two measures was only in the range 
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of 0.5 – 0.6 for the three SSBFs analyzed. However, our use of this proxy for bank credit is 
consistent with our use of the firm’s answers to these questions in calculating whether or not a 
firm used bank credit, which is a more important analysis variable for this study. 
 
7. Summary and Conclusions 
 In this study, we use data from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business 
Finances to provide new information about the use of credit by small businesses in the U.S. More 
specifically, we first analyze firms that do and do not use credit, i.e., leveraged and unleveraged 
firms; and then analyze how firms that do use credit (leveraged firms) allocate their liabilities 
between bank credit (obtained from financial institutions) and trade credit (obtained from 
suppliers), in order to shed new light upon these critically important issues. We utilize data from 
the Federal Reserve Board’s 1993, 1998 and 2003 SSBFs—a series of nationally representative 
samples of small U.S. businesses—to estimate a Heckman selection model, where the manager 
of a firm first decides if it needs credit, and then decides from where to obtain this credit—from 
financial institutions (in the form of bank credit) or from suppliers (in the form of trade credit).  
 We find that one in five small firms uses no credit, one in five uses trade credit only, one 
five uses bank credit only, and two in five use both bank credit and trade credit. From these 
results it is clear that trade credit is more than just a substitute for bank credit, as 40 percent of 
small businesses use both types of credit simultaneously. These results are consistent across the 
three SSBFs we examine—1993, 1998 and 2003.  
When compared to firms that use credit, we find that use no credit firms are significantly 
smaller, more profitable, more liquid and of better credit quality, but hold fewer tangible assets. 
We also find that use no credit firms are more likely to be found in the services industries and in 
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the wholesale and retail-trade industries. In general, these findings are consistent with the 
pecking-order theory of firm capital structure. 
 Use trade credit firms are larger, more liquid, of worse credit quality, and less likely to 
be a firm that primarily provides services. Among, use trade credit firms, the amount of trade 
credit used as a percentage of assets is positively related to liquidity and negatively related to 
credit quality and is lower at firms that primarily provide services. In general, these results are 
consistent with the financing-advantage theory of trade credit.  
 Use bank credit firms are larger, less profitable, less liquid and more opaque as measured 
by firm age, i.e., younger. Among use bank credit firms, the amount of bank credit used as a 
percentage of assets is positively related firm liquidity and to firm opacity as measured by firm 
age. Again, these results are generally consistent with the pecking-order theory of capital 
structure, but with some notable exceptions. The amount of Bank Credit Used is positively 
related to profitability and negatively related to tangibility of assets, both in contradiction to the 
pecking-order theory. 
We contribute to the literature on the availability of credit in at least two important ways.  
First, we document that one in five small U.S. firms uses no bank credit or trade credit, and 
provide the first rigorous analysis of the differences in these firms and other small U.S. firms that 
do use credit.15 A better understanding of why one in five small U.S. firms uses no credit should 
provide both academics and policymakers with new insights into why these firms choose not to 
participate in the credit markets, and what are the economic and financial consequences for such 
firms. Our new evidence also should provide guidance to policymakers regarding how to tailor 
                                                 
15 Other researchers (e.g., Chakravarty and Yilmazer (2008) and Cole (2009)) have examined 
differences in firms that do and do not apply for credit, but not differences in firms that do or do 
not use credit. According to Cole (2009), a substantial portion of firms that do not apply for 
credit reports substantial debt in their capital structure.  
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economic and tax policies as well as regulations to encourage unleveraged firms that are credit 
constrained to enter the credit markets. 
Second, for those small U.S. firms that do participate in the credit markets, we provide 
new evidence regarding factors that determine their use of trade credit and bank credit, and 
whether these two types of credit are substitutes (Meltzer, 1960) or complements (Burkart and 
Ellingsen, 2004). Our evidence strongly suggests that they are complements, as two in five small 
U.S. firms consistently use credit of both types. This is not surprising because trade credit is 
primarily short-term whereas bank credit is typically longer-term.   
 This evidence has important implications for monetary policy, as trade credit has been 
theorized to be a shock absorber for small firms during times of tight money. If trade credit is a 
complement rather than a substitute for bank credit, then policymakers need to take this into 
account when tightening monetary policy by making available to small businesses alternative 
sources of financing. 
 Our evidence also has important implications for fiscal policy, as the administration and 
Congress look for ways to stimulate credit provided to small business lending. Existing proposals 
focus exclusively on bank lending while totally ignoring trade credit, which is an equally 
important source of capital for small businesses. Complementary proposals should explore how 
to expand trade credit offered by supplier as well as how to expand bank credit offered by 
financial institutions. Provision of new tax credits for suppliers that expand their lending is one 
path by which to accomplish this goal. Provision of TARP funds to suppliers is another. Yet no 
one is offering such proposals. 
As the first rigorous analysis of small U.S. businesses that choose to use no bank credit 
and no trade credit, this study provides both academics and policymakers with new insights into 
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the availability of credit to small firms, and how to tailor macroeconomic policies, regulations 
and taxes to help small businesses obtain needed credit and reach their optimal capital structures. 
Policies designed to help these firms improve their capitalization should lead to higher growth in 
both employment and output (GDP). 
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Dependent Variables:
Use Credit Firm reported that it used bank or trade credit during reference year.
Use Trade Credit Firm reported that it used trade credit during reference year.
Use Bank Credit Firm reported that it used bank credit during reference year.
Amount of Bank Credit Sum of outstanding balances of all loans during the reference year.
Amount of Trade Credit Amount of accounts payable in the reference year.
Explanatory Variables:
Firm Characteristics
Sales Annual sales revenues
Assets Total Assets
Cash Cash
Current Assets Sum of accounts receivable, inventory and other current assets.
Tangible Assets Sum of land and depreciable assets
Growth Positive Sales Growth is positive.
Corporation Firm is organized as an S-corporation or C-corporation.
Firm Age Years since firm was established.
Firm Delinquency Firm has been delinquent on a business obligation during past three years.
Rural Firm is located in a rural area, i.e., outside of an MSA.
Owner Characteristics
Owner Age Age of primary owner.
Female Primary owner is female.
Asian Primary owner is Asian.
Black Primary owner is black.
Hispanic Primary owner is Hispanic.
College Degree Primary owner has a college degree.
Graduate Degree Primary owner has a graduate degree.
Owner's Delinquent Obligations Owner has been delinquent on a personal obligation during past three years.
Ownership Percentage Ownership percentage of primary owner.
Industrial Classification
Construction Firm is in SIC 10 - 19
Primary Mfg Firm is in SIC 20 - 29
Secondary Mfg Firm is in SIC 30 - 39
Transportation Firm is in SIC 40 - 49
Wholesale Firm is in SIC 50 -51
Retail Firm is in SIC 52 - 59
Insurance/Real Estate Firm is in SIC 60 - 69 (excludes financial institutions)
Business Services Firm is in SIC 70 - 79
Professional Services Firm is in SIC 80 - 89
Table 1:
Definitions of Analysis Variables
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1993 1998 2003
No Credit
Observations (unweighted) 656 622 614       
Observations (weighted, millions) 0.911 1.087 1.239
Percentage (weighted) 18.6% 21.5% 21.1%
Trade Credit Only
Observations (unweighted) 828 662 619       
Observations (weighted, millions) 1.116 1.171 1.074
Percentage (weighted) 22.8% 23.1% 18.3%
Bank Credit Only
Observations (unweighted) 761 506 570       
Observations (weighted, millions) 0.866 0.811 1.083
Percentage (weighted) 17.7% 16.0% 18.5%
Trade and Bank Credit
Observations (unweighted) 1,917    1,395    1,765    
Observations (weighted, millions) 1.991 1.993 2.466
Percentage (weighted) 40.8% 39.4% 42.1%
Total
Observations (unweighted) 4,162    3,185    3,568    
Observations (weighted, millions) 4.885 5.062 5.862
Percentage (weighted) 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Distribution of Firms by Use of Trade Credit and Bank Credit
Table 2:
 
Data are from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 SSBFs. Firms are classified as using no credit if the firm 
reported that is used neither bank credit nor trade credit during the survey year. Firms are 
classified as using trade credit only if the firm reported that it used trade credit but did not use 
bank credit during the survey year. Firms are classified as using bank credit only if the firm 
reported that it used bank credit but did not use trade credit during the survey year. Firms are 
classified as using trade and bank credit if the firm reported that it used trade credit and used 
bank credit during the survey year. Weighted statistics are obtained by using the survey sampling 
weights, which are needed because the surveys are not simple random samples. 
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Table 3A: 
Descriptive Statistics for Firms that Use and Do Not Use  Credit, 1993 SSBF 
Variable All Firms No Credit Use Credit Difference t-test  
Obs. 4,162 656 3,506
Assets 293,880 128,089 331,914 -203,826 -7.93 a
Sales 566,103 228,656 643,517 -414,861 -13.45 a
ROA 0.601 0.875 0.539 0.337 4.93 a
Cash 0.186 0.278 0.165 0.112 8.54 a
Current Assets 0.329 0.280 0.340 -0.060 -4.26 a
Tangible Assets 0.399 0.408 0.397 0.011 0.74
Sales Growth is Positive 0.420 0.420 0.420 0.001 0.04
Corporation 0.480 0.326 0.515 -0.190 -8.78 a
Firm Age 14.114 14.937 13.925 1.012 1.86 c
D&B Credit Score N/A N/A N/A
Firm Delinquency 0.191 0.087 0.215 -0.128 -9.29 a
Firm located in MSA 0.786 0.814 0.780 0.034 1.90 c
Owner Age 49.295 51.495 48.790 2.705 4.92 a
Owner Experience 18.702 19.360 18.552 0.808 1.47
Owner is Female 0.209 0.235 0.203 0.033 1.70 c
Owner is Asian 0.036 0.048 0.033 0.015 1.60
Owner is Black 0.030 0.036 0.028 0.007 0.88
Owner is Hispanic 0.043 0.044 0.043 0.001 0.06
Owner has College Degree 0.260 0.214 0.271 -0.057 -2.98 a
Owner has Graduate Degree 0.202 0.240 0.193 0.047 2.46 b
Owner Percentage Ownership 81.509 88.018 80.016 8.002 7.66 a
Owner Delinquency 0.137 0.092 0.147 -0.055 -4.06 a
Construction 0.143 0.085 0.157 -0.071 -5.35 a
Primary Mfg 0.039 0.006 0.046 -0.040 -8.29 a
Secondary Mfg 0.041 0.019 0.046 -0.027 -3.97 a
Transportation 0.027 0.025 0.028 -0.003 -0.35
Wholesale 0.082 0.056 0.088 -0.032 -2.94 a
Retail 0.217 0.182 0.224 -0.042 -2.37 b
Insurance/Real Estate 0.068 0.098 0.061 0.037 2.77 a
Business Services 0.215 0.304 0.194 0.109 5.30 a
Professional Services 0.168 0.224 0.155 0.069 3.67 a
 Data are from the 1993 SSBF. Firms are classified as using credit if the firm reported that is 
used either bank credit or trade credit during 1993. Means are presented for all firms and 
separately for firms that use credit and firms that use no credit. In the last column is the t-statistic 
for a test of significant differences in the means of the two groups. 
a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 - 41 -
Table 3B: 
Descriptive Statistics for Firms that Use and Do Not Use Credit, 1998 SSBF 
Variable All Firms No Credit Use Credit Difference t-test  
Obs. 3,164 621 2,543
Assets 257,653 66,911 309,928 -243,017 -14.44 a
Sales 524,774 155,316 626,028 -470,712 -14.81 a
ROA 0.843 1.101 0.772 0.329 4.55 a
Cash 0.236 0.348 0.206 0.142 9.17 a
Current Assets 0.322 0.279 0.334 -0.055 -3.44 a
Tangible Assets 0.374 0.310 0.391 -0.082 -4.89 a
Sales Growth is Positive 0.399 0.356 0.411 -0.055 -2.46 b
Corporation 0.427 0.258 0.474 -0.216 -10.37 a
Firm Age 13.145 12.152 13.418 -1.266 -2.52 b
D&B Credit Score 3.008 2.938 3.027 -0.089 -2.26 b
Firm Delinquency 0.136 0.045 0.161 -0.116 -10.27 a
Firm located in MSA 0.797 0.824 0.789 0.035 1.95 c
Owner Age 50.057 51.128 49.764 1.364 2.45 b
Owner Experience 18.062 17.043 18.341 -1.298 -2.28 b
Owner is Female 0.241 0.312 0.221 0.090 4.27 a
Owner is Asian 0.043 0.052 0.041 0.011 1.08
Owner is Black 0.041 0.059 0.036 0.023 2.16 b
Owner is Hispanic 0.057 0.081 0.051 0.031 2.48 b
Owner has College Degree 0.300 0.290 0.303 -0.013 -0.61
Owner has Graduate Degree 0.182 0.199 0.178 0.021 1.16
Owner Percentage Ownership 85.668 90.987 84.210 6.777 7.07 a
Owner Delinquency 0.127 0.106 0.132 -0.026 -1.79 c
Construction 0.118 0.043 0.139 -0.096 -8.77 a
Primary Mfg 0.037 0.030 0.039 -0.009 -1.16
Secondary Mfg 0.046 0.025 0.051 -0.027 -3.42 a
Transportation 0.036 0.048 0.033 0.015 1.55
Wholesale 0.069 0.049 0.074 -0.025 -2.42 b
Retail 0.193 0.187 0.194 -0.008 -0.42
Insurance/Real Estate 0.065 0.087 0.058 0.029 2.28 b
Business Services 0.250 0.270 0.245 0.025 1.20
Professional Services 0.184 0.259 0.164 0.095 4.80 a
 Data are from the 1998 SSBF. Firms are classified as using credit if the firm reported that is 
used either bank credit or trade credit during 1998. Means are presented for all firms and 
separately for firms that use credit and firms that use no credit. In the last column is the t-statistic 
for a test of significant differences in the means of the two groups. 
a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 3C: 
Descriptive Statistics for Firms that Use and Do Not Use Credit, 2003 SSBF 
Variable All Firms No Credit Use Credit Difference t-test  
Obs. 3,623 618 3,005
Assets 340,380 96,680 404,700 -308,020 -15.01 a
Sales 624,307 179,933 741,592 -561,659 -17.58 a
ROA 0.557 0.735 0.510 0.226 4.81 a
Cash 0.231 0.404 0.185 0.219 12.75 a
Current Assets 0.306 0.294 0.310 -0.016 -0.98
Tangible Assets 0.328 0.278 0.341 -0.062 -3.77 a
Sales Growth is Positive 0.406 0.321 0.428 -0.107 -4.72 a
Corporation 0.450 0.271 0.497 -0.225 -10.36 a
Firm Age 14.190 12.973 14.512 -1.538 -2.98 a
D&B Credit Score 3.610 3.459 3.650 -0.191 -3.15 a
Firm Delinquency 0.157 0.060 0.182 -0.122 -9.62 a
Firm located in MSA 0.793 0.834 0.782 0.052 2.86 a
Owner Age 51.506 52.337 51.287 1.050 1.83 c
Owner Experience 19.610 17.263 20.230 -2.967 -5.12 a
Owner is Female 0.263 0.392 0.229 0.163 7.10 a
Owner is Asian 0.044 0.056 0.041 0.014 1.32
Owner is Black 0.039 0.060 0.034 0.026 2.35 b
Owner is Hispanic 0.044 0.049 0.042 0.006 0.63
Owner has College Degree 0.291 0.319 0.283 0.036 1.59
Owner has Graduate Degree 0.208 0.237 0.201 0.036 1.78 c
Owner Percentage Ownership 81.987 86.755 80.728 6.026 5.50 a
Owner Delinquency 0.121 0.098 0.127 -0.029 -1.97 b
Construction 0.117 0.057 0.133 -0.076 -6.36 a
Primary Mfg 0.031 0.018 0.034 -0.016 -2.42 b
Secondary Mfg 0.040 0.019 0.045 -0.026 -3.58 a
Transportation 0.039 0.020 0.044 -0.024 -3.27 a
Wholesale 0.057 0.043 0.060 -0.018 -1.78 c
Retail 0.187 0.168 0.191 -0.024 -1.30
Insurance/Real Estate 0.067 0.081 0.064 0.017 1.30
Business Services 0.253 0.306 0.239 0.068 3.09 a
Professional Services 0.210 0.288 0.189 0.098 4.61 a
 Data are from the 2003 SSBF. Firms are classified as using credit if the firm reported that is 
used either bank credit or trade credit during 2003. Means are presented for all firms and 
separately for firms that use credit and firms that use no credit. In the last column is the t-statistic 
for a test of significant differences in the means of the two groups. 
a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: 
Determinants of the Use of Credit 
Variable Effect t-stat  Effect t-stat  Effect t-stat  
Intercept  2.23 b  1.66 c  1.58
log of Sales 0.048 13.56 a 0.041 12.76 a 0.032 12.41 a
ROA -0.016 -4.57 a -0.025 -5.41 a -0.030 -4.64 a
Cash -0.153 -7.14 a -0.212 -9.22 a -0.219 -11.54 a
Tangible Assets -0.062 -3.54 a -0.072 -3.60 a -0.050 -2.79 a
Sales Growth is Positive -0.003 -0.27 0.007 0.58 0.024 2.20 b
Corporation -0.010 -0.82 0.042 2.81 a 0.029 2.39 b
log of Firm Age -0.010 -1.02 -0.014 -1.34 -0.012 -1.60
Firm Delinquency 0.057 3.31 a 0.135 4.86 a 0.008 2.05 b
MSA -0.041 -3.20 a -0.018 -1.14 -0.022 -1.62
log of Owner Age -0.112 -4.06 a -0.075 -2.34 b -0.075 -2.70 a
log of Owner Experience 0.013 1.13 0.042 3.46 a 0.044 4.34 a
Owner is Female 0.011 0.90 -0.007 -0.52 -0.037 -3.32 a
Owner is Asian -0.044 -1.86 c -0.022 -0.79 -0.047 -1.95 c
Owner is Black -0.016 -0.57 -0.024 -0.87 -0.030 -1.27
Owner is Hispanic -0.001 -0.04 -0.057 -2.46 b -0.025 -1.04
Owner has College Degree 0.026 2.06 b 0.004 0.27 -0.022 -1.74 c
Owner has Graduate Degree -0.004 -0.26 0.011 0.58 0.004 0.24
Owner Percentage Ownership -0.0006 -2.44 b -0.0004 -1.36 -0.0005 -2.03 b
Owner Delinquency 0.033 1.89 c -0.023 -1.07 0.030 1.78 c
Primary Mfg 0.155 2.70 a -0.138 -3.19 a -0.008 -0.19
Secondary Mfg 0.013 0.34 -0.102 -2.35 b -0.017 -0.44
Transportation -0.095 -2.89 a -0.256 -6.49 a 0.001 0.02
Wholesale -0.064 -2.52 b -0.176 -4.67 a -0.070 -2.18 b
Retail -0.082 -4.22 a -0.196 -6.60 a -0.087 -3.69 a
Insurance/Real Estate -0.118 -5.15 a -0.216 -6.44 a -0.085 -3.09 a
Business Services -0.095 -5.23 a -0.150 -5.33 a -0.078 -3.55 a
Professional Services -0.098 -4.69 a -0.219 -7.27 a -0.099 -4.40 a
1993 1998 2003
Marginal Marginal Marginal
 
Results from a weighted univariate probit model used to explain the determinants of the use of 
credit by privately held firms. Data are from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 SSBFs. Firms are 
classified as using credit if the firm reported that is used either bank credit or trade credit during 
the survey year. Variable definitions appear in Table 1. 
a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: 
Determinants of the Use of Trade Credit 
Variable Effect t-stat  Effect t-stat  Effect t-stat  
Intercept  0.48  -0.99  -0.58
log of Sales 0.008 1.71 c 0.012 3.09 a 0.013 3.62 a
ROA -0.001 -0.17 -0.001 -0.08 -0.014 -1.50
Cash 0.126 3.55 a 0.143 4.25 a 0.180 6.13 a
Current Assets 0.160 5.98 a 0.162 5.97 a 0.075 3.11 a
Sales Growth is Positive -0.023 -1.55 0.004 0.26 0.035 2.38 b
Corporation -0.043 -2.65 a 0.062 3.50 a 0.072 4.64 a
log of Firm Age -0.004 -0.29 -0.007 -0.52 0.032 3.17 a
Firm Delinquency 0.099 4.63 a 0.136 4.92 a 0.007 1.34
MSA -0.003 -0.21 0.014 0.78 -0.035 -1.97 b
log of Owner Age 0.011 0.29 0.025 0.60 0.012 0.30
log of Owner Experience 0.027 1.67 c 0.023 1.47 0.007 0.50
Owner is Female 0.005 0.26 -0.017 -0.98 -0.004 -0.25
Owner is Asian 0.001 0.02 -0.014 -0.37 -0.004 -0.12
Owner is Black -0.011 -0.28 -0.028 -0.75 -0.110 -3.26 a
Owner is Hispanic -0.084 -2.80 a -0.088 -2.91 a -0.050 -1.58
Owner has College Degree 0.024 1.43 0.023 1.23 0.027 1.59
Owner has Graduate Degree 0.037 1.76 c 0.020 0.85 0.051 2.39 b
Owner Pctg. Ownership -0.0009 -2.98 a 0.0003 0.93 -0.0001 -0.41
Owner Delinquency 0.006 0.28 -0.072 -2.87 a 0.012 0.55
Primary Mfg -0.005 -0.13 0.024 0.45 -0.132 -2.77 a
Secondary Mfg 0.003 0.07 0.085 1.50 -0.087 -1.88 c
Transportation -0.166 -4.17 a -0.191 -4.58 a -0.217 -5.57 a
Wholesale -0.023 -0.68 -0.101 -2.68 a -0.138 -3.29 a
Retail -0.052 -2.07 b -0.071 -2.40 b -0.114 -3.62 a
Insurance/Real Estate -0.205 -6.79 a -0.258 -7.54 a -0.264 -7.38 a
Business Services -0.071 -2.93 a -0.070 -2.60 a -0.171 -5.90 a
Professional Services -0.154 -5.62 a -0.131 -4.27 a -0.239 -7.58 a
1993 1998 2003
Marginal Marginal Marginal
 
Results from a bivariate probit selection model used to explain the determinants of the use of 
credit by privately held firms, conditional upon using either bank credit or trade credit. Data are 
from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 SSBFs. Firms are classified as using credit if the firm reported 
that it used trade credit during the survey year. Variable definitions appear in Table 1. 
a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 6: 
Determinants of the Use of Bank Credit 
Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  
Variable Effect t-stat  Effect t-stat  Effect t-stat  
Intercept  1.04  1.24  1.97 b
log of Sales 0.053 10.03 a 0.038 7.88 a 0.027 7.14 a
ROA -0.031 -5.70 a -0.017 -2.50 b -0.037 -3.77 a
Cash -0.366 -10.42 a -0.162 -4.58 a -0.354 -11.32 a
Tangible Assets 0.029 1.19 0.143 4.93 a -0.021 -0.81
Sales Growth is Positive 0.074 4.97 a 0.010 0.58 0.024 1.55
Corporation 0.013 0.79 -0.010 -0.51 0.001 0.08
log of Firm Age -0.031 -2.31 b -0.020 -1.36 -0.062 -5.28 a
Firm Delinquency 0.062 3.10 a 0.028 1.03 -0.005 -0.90
MSA -0.029 -1.69 c -0.041 -1.90 c 0.026 1.50
log of Owner Age -0.155 -3.97 a -0.086 -1.76 c -0.052 -1.22
log of Owner Experience 0.005 0.28 -0.011 -0.58 0.001 0.06
Owner is Female -0.016 -0.94 -0.033 -1.65 c -0.032 -1.86 c
Owner is Asian -0.058 -1.65 -0.078 -1.97 b -0.046 -1.31
Owner is Black 0.040 0.93 0.019 0.42 -0.050 -1.30
Owner is Hispanic 0.007 0.20 0.071 1.76 c 0.004 0.10
Owner has College Degree -0.034 -2.05 b 0.007 0.33 -0.063 -3.68 a
Owner has Graduate Degree -0.050 -2.41 b -0.005 -0.18 -0.045 -2.04 b
Owner Pctg. Ownership 0.0012 4.14 a -0.0008 -1.97 b 0.0003 0.91
Owner Delinquency -0.064 -2.96 a 0.023 0.78 -0.041 -1.82 c
Primary Mfg -0.024 -0.67 -0.110 -2.37 b 0.043 0.90
Secondary Mfg -0.045 -1.28 -0.097 -2.31 b -0.049 -1.26
Transportation 0.133 2.45 b 0.122 1.90 c 0.119 2.37 b
Wholesale -0.056 -1.93 c -0.010 -0.25 -0.078 -2.23 b
Retail -0.033 -1.44 -0.069 -2.27 b -0.084 -3.20 a
Insurance/Real Estate 0.080 2.33 b 0.160 3.12 a 0.101 2.67 a
Business Services -0.008 -0.36 -0.064 -2.27 b 0.007 0.29
Professional Services 0.065 2.37 b -0.028 -0.84 0.055 1.87 c
1993 1998 2003
 Results from a bivariate probit selection model used to explain the determinants of the use of 
credit by privately held firms, conditional upon using either bank credit or trade credit. Data are 
from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 SSBFs. Firms are classified as using bank credit if the firm 
reported that it used bank credit during the survey year. Variable definitions appear in Table 1. 
a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 7: 
Determinants of the Amount of Trade Credit Used 
      
Variable Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  
Intercept -0.047 -0.54 0.000 0.00 0.044 0.39
log of Sales -0.001 -0.45 0.018 4.26 a 0.009 2.99 a
ROA 0.008 2.22 b 0.012 1.80 c -0.005 -0.76
Cash 0.143 7.08 a 0.017 0.55 0.119 5.32 a
Current Assets 0.190 12.64 a 0.140 5.62 a 0.162 9.03 a
Sales Growth is Positive 0.002 0.25 0.021 1.44 0.022 2.11 b
Corporation -0.004 -0.42 -0.035 -2.09 b 0.041 3.68 a
log of Firm Age -0.009 -1.13 -0.052 -4.19 a -0.017 -2.31 b
Firm Delinquency 0.039 3.57 a 0.122 5.60 a 0.025 6.98 a
MSA 0.032 3.21 a 0.033 1.81 c 0.017 1.38
log of Owner Age 0.031 1.33 0.007 0.16 -0.015 -0.51
log of Owner Experience 0.013 1.41 0.017 1.13 0.005 0.43
Owner is Female -0.006 -0.57 -0.025 -1.42 0.001 0.11
Owner is Asian -0.016 -0.70 -0.045 -1.22 -0.037 -1.47
Owner is Black 0.006 0.26 0.002 0.05 -0.008 -0.24
Owner is Hispanic -0.019 -0.87 -0.003 -0.09 -0.024 -0.89
Owner has College Degree 0.005 0.53 -0.003 -0.17 0.041 3.44 a
Owner has Graduate Degree -0.021 -1.70 c -0.054 -2.36 b 0.030 1.91 c
Owner Pctg. Ownership 0.0000 -0.21 -0.0002 -0.63 0.0003 1.51
Owner Delinquency 0.050 3.89 a 0.073 2.92 a 0.050 3.19 a
Primary Mfg -0.042 -2.06 b -0.069 -1.79 c -0.008 -0.28
Secondary Mfg -0.007 -0.36 -0.143 -4.17 a -0.034 -1.33
Transportation -0.046 -1.61 -0.078 -1.66 c -0.028 -1.01
Wholesale -0.007 -0.40 -0.023 -0.71 0.017 0.74
Retail -0.056 -4.21 a -0.103 -4.09 a -0.036 -2.12 b
Insurance/Real Estate -0.066 -3.03 a -0.073 -1.78 c -0.041 -1.59
Business Services -0.032 -2.33 b -0.092 -3.94 a -0.023 -1.41
Professional Services -0.085 -5.20 a -0.106 -3.74 a -0.087 -4.39 a
1993 1998 2003
 Results from weighted least-squares regression analysis to explain the determinants of the 
amount of trade credit used by privately held firms, conditional upon using trade credit. Data are 
from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 SSBFs. The amount of trade credit used is proxied by the value of 
accounts payable scaled by the value of total assets. Variable definitions appear in Table 1. 
a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 8: 
Determinants of the Amount of Bank Credit Used 
      
Variable Coeff. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  
Intercept 0.984 7.37 a 1.201 7.10 a 1.188 4.62 a
log of Sales -0.053 -11.49 a -0.018 -4.11 a -0.048 -7.11 a
ROA 0.016 2.78 a 0.017 2.36 b 0.047 2.61 a
Cash -0.365 -9.29 a -0.344 -8.61 a -0.106 -1.65 c
Tangible Assets -0.117 -5.33 a -0.084 -3.49 a -0.421 -10.53 a
Sales Growth is Positive -0.006 -0.45 -0.010 -0.65 0.050 2.01 b
Corporation -0.004 -0.31 0.008 0.47 0.098 3.65 a
log of Firm Age -0.058 -4.22 a -0.064 -4.73 a -0.038 -2.13 b
Firm Delinquency -0.005 -0.27 0.061 2.72 a -0.026 -2.97 a
MSA -0.020 -1.37 -0.009 -0.47 0.089 2.96 a
log of Owner Age 0.056 1.56 -0.051 -1.15 0.047 0.68
log of Owner Experience -0.007 -0.51 0.004 0.25 -0.030 -1.19
Owner is Female 0.020 1.28 0.027 1.43 -0.025 -0.83
Owner is Asian -0.012 -0.33 0.032 0.79 0.079 1.29
Owner is Black -0.072 -2.03 b 0.002 0.06 -0.061 -0.89
Owner is Hispanic -0.038 -1.29 0.014 0.44 0.027 0.47
Owner has College Degree 0.008 0.52 -0.028 -1.58 -0.006 -0.22
Owner has Graduate Degree -0.025 -1.30 -0.058 -2.40 b -0.018 -0.49
Owner Pctg. Ownership 0.0002 0.69 -0.0005 -1.48 0.0004 0.86
Owner Delinquency 0.001 0.07 0.015 0.62 0.076 2.06 b
Primary Mfg -0.013 -0.41 0.063 1.46 -0.011 -0.16
Secondary Mfg -0.071 -2.20 b -0.023 -0.60 -0.136 -2.09 b
Transportation 0.090 2.48 b 0.102 2.43 b 0.258 4.17 a
Wholesale 0.000 -0.02 -0.081 -2.43 b -0.203 -3.38 a
Retail -0.059 -2.91 a -0.051 -1.95 c -0.112 -2.56 b
Insurance/Real Estate 0.102 3.54 a 0.074 2.16 b -0.107 -1.81 c
Business Services 0.012 0.59 0.061 2.45 b 0.008 0.19
Professional Services 0.033 1.37 0.081 2.71 a -0.061 -1.31
1993 1998 2003
  
Results from weighted least-squares regression analysis to explain the determinants of the 
amount of bank credit used by privately held firms, conditional upon using bank credit. Data are 
from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 SSBFs. The amount of bank credit used is proxied by the sum of 
outstanding balances on all loans scaled by the value of total assets. Variable definitions appear 
in Table 1.  
a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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